Tag Archives: financial reform

11.06.2011 | The Cost of Seat Belts

Can we assume that seat belts make us safer? Maybe. Writing about seat belts in 1975, University of Chicago economist Sam Peltzman described what we now call the Peltzman Effect.

Sam Peltzman said that yes, seat belts do make us safer. However, making us safer has an unintended consequence. Because seat belts protect us, we might drive more dangerously. As Peltzman describes it, when regulation changes incentives, people’s response can offset the intent of the regulation.

Since the Peltzman Effect was first proposed, researchers have explored its broader implications. The availability of flood insurance can encourage people to build waterfront homes. Taking Lipitor might increase the amount of cheese and steak that we consume. And today, the Peltzman Effect is cited when financial reform is discussed. Doesn’t it make you think about “Too big to fail”?

The Economic Lesson

In economic terms, seat belts lower the cost of dangerous driving. Thinking of the law of demand, lower cost creates an increase in quantity demanded. If the cost of dangerous driving drops, some people will accept the risk more readily.

An Economic Question: Using supply and demand, how might you graph the impact of seat belts on safe driving?

Posted by: adminEcon
Tags: financial reform, incentive, Peltzman Effect, safety regulation
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07.18.2010 | Figuring Out Financial Regulation

Words cannot describe the 2300 pages of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. In a way, because it says so much, it tells us very little. Still though, after looking at the bill and several news summaries, I wanted to share some main ideas.

At first, “risk” and “protection” were the two words that came to mind. Risk: Lawmakers want to manage the impact of the risks taken by financial institutions. Protection: Lawmakers hope to protect consumers from making unwise financial decisions.

Then, I discovered a second approach that made sense to me at WSJ.com where they described the basics of the bill through four categories:

1) Government: Its powers will grow in order to preserve financial stability. Starting with the Federal Reserve, countless government regulatory agencies will be transformed.

2) Banks: Financial firms will experience new restrictions on trading different types of complex securities.

3) Consumers: A new bureau to protect consumers will be established. Its responsibilities will impact a plethora of financial activities.

4) Investors: Different investing groups such as hedge funds, people who give investment advice, insurance companies, and those who create securities packages will have new constraints.

Essentially then we have four groups responding to a Congress that hopes to control financial risk and expand financial protection. With 2300 pages of text, mathematically, the ways in which the four groups can respond and then interact create countless permutations.

The Economic Lesson

Passed in 1932 and 1933, the Glass-Steagall Act separated investment and commercial banking, changed the structure of the Federal Reserve, and created the FDIC. Although it was formally repealed in 1999, regulators permitted financial institutions to violate its spirit beforehand. When I read the act, I was surprised to see language that was as tough to follow as the current financial reform bill. However, as 34 pages of legislation, it had fewer variables and appeared to cover many of the necessary regulatory details.

Posted by: adminEcon
Tags: Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, financial reform, Glass Steagall Act, government regulation
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06.27.2010 | The Marshmallow Test and Financial Reform

Is it possible that the marshmallow test relates to financial reform? As described in a 2009 New Yorker article by Jonah Lehrer and a WNYC Radio Lab podcast, a marshmallow test given to 4 year olds might predict adult behavior.

40 years ago, psychologist Walter Mischel began studying gratification by giving young children a choice. A child and a single marshmallow were left in a room. The child could have one marshmallow now or two later. 500 children were tested. Mischel concluded that at 4 years old, certain children can resist temptation. Some could last 20 minutes while others capitulated immediately. The average resistance time was 7 or 8 minutes. (Researchers also used chocolate bars and Oreo cookies.)

Years later, in a follow-up study, Mischel discovered that the SAT scores of children who held out for 15 or 20 minutes were 210 points higher than those who lasted only 30 seconds. Returning to the same people 40 years later, he found that the high delayers had better jobs and were skinnier.

Looking at other studies, Lehrer again found a connection between our “hard wiring” and our behavior. In his book, How We Decide, discussing the connection between our “decision making apparatus” and our financial behavior, he suggests that an unaffordable McMansion bought through a subprime mortgage could be increasingly attractive if the potential loss is long term and the gratification is current.

The Economic Lesson

And this is where we can return to financial reform. If the intersection of neurological and psychological research does indeed point to certain people having certain innately unhealthy tendencies, how much should government protect them and everyone else?

Posted by: adminEcon
Tags: financial reform, gratification, Jonah Lehrer, marshmallow study, Walter Mischel
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05.19.2010 | Airplane Crashes and Financial Crashes

When an airplane crashes, investigators rush to the scene, gather evidence, and ultimately hope to emerge with updated safety suggestions. It would be wonderful if we, when assessing the “flash crash” or slower stock market dives, could also diagnose the problems, identify the faulty mechanisms, and repair or redesign them.

George Mason economist Russell Roberts tells us, though, that financial crashes are very different from the world of aviation. He suggests that the financial world reflects the interaction of “investors, regulators, and politicians” in which the behavior of one group sets the other two in motion. Consequently, the permutations are infinite.

His advice? He provides a short list from which I especially liked his reminder that “Capitalism is a profit and loss system.” He also says that “Policymakers who make creditors and lenders whole should be excoriated, condemned and called to account rather than praised and honored.”

Your opinion?

The Economic Lesson

Perhaps economist Friedrich Hayek (1899-1992, the Austrian school) summed up our problem when he said “The curious task of economics is to demonstrate to men how iittle they really know about what they imagine they can design.”

Posted by: adminEcon
Tags: crashes, financial reform, financial regulation, Friedrich Hayek
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04.27.2010 | Max Bialystock and CDOs

Comparing the deal to Bialystock, Bloom, and Springtime For Hitler in The Producers, NPR’s This American Life looked at how a Chicago hedge fund made money on seemingly unprofitable CDO transactions. Available as a podcast, the story made the CDO derivatives world entirely understandable.

The protagonist of the story is Magnetar, a Chicago hedge fund. The plot focuses on why Magnetar would buy a “layer” of a package of mortgage securities that was so speculative that its default was probable. The “climax” relates to the “insurance” that the firm purchased on the package. The podcast uses broadway music, a derivatives song that they commissioned, and clear explanations that provide insight. Listening to it is worth the opportunity cost.

The Economic Life

Imagine a big box filled with mortgages. Fundamentally, you are looking at a CDO, a collateralized debt obligation. Through financial reform legislation, Congress wants to limit who can buy and sell these packages and the securities that relate to them.

Posted by: adminEcon
Tags: CDOs, financial reform, hedge funds, The Producers, This American Life
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