Subscribe to our RSS feed
EconLife.com connects economics to everyday life, current events and history.

Tag Archives: marriage markets

Decisions Have An Opportunity Cost That Require Tradeoffs

One of the first calls a new Nobel Prize winner might get is from Adam Smith, editor of NobelPrize.org. As you might expect, hearing his name, people initially wonder if the call is for real. Usually Mr. Smith does a quick interview and sometimes, if the winner missed the congratulatory phone call, he shares the good news.

This year, Adam Smith called other 2012 Nobel recipients but not the people who got the econ prize. 89 years old, Lloyd Shapley, professor emeritus, University of California, Los Angeles was not available to talk. His co-prize winner, Alvin E. Roth, a Harvard professor (who will soon be at Stanford), told a bit about himself and his work to a different Nobel caller. (I am disappointed that I cannot say Adam Smith called the new econ laureates.)

In markets that do not involve money, it is tough to create optimal matches. Working separately, these scholars created the math that made it possible. As Dr. Roth explains in his Nobel interview,  he developed a practical application of the concept that Lloyd Shapley and David Gale created. Because of Shapley and Roth, more donors and recipients are paired for kidneys, more people can get assigned the roommates they each want and more NYC children can go to schools that prefer them. You can see the complexities in the diagram below from a Nobel website.

Technically the Nobel Prize in economics is really the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel because it was created long after Alfred Nobel died and therefore was not in his will. Interestingly, with Lloyd Shapley a mathematician, this year again, one of the economics prizes did not go to an economist. In 2002 it want to Daniel Kahneman, a psychologist and in 2009 to Elinor Ostrom, a political scientist.

A final fact: I was delighted that in his interview, Dr, Roth said, “Yes, economics is about real life, so I’m very interested in that.”

Sources and Resources: I suggest listening firsthand to Dr. Roth’s interview so that you can “meet him” and hear firsthand what he does. To learn more about how Dr. Shapley and his associate, David Gale, established the groundwork for Dr. Roth, their brief and easy to understand 1962 math article about “pairwise” matching in marriage markets is fascinating. For the detailed explanation of the three scholars’ accomplishments, Nobel has an excellent description that also has more about the diagram I’ve included. Finally, I suggest looking at Dr. Roth’s blog. He has a great smiling picture of him and his wife with the caption, “An inadvertent ad for Starbucks.”

 

 

 

 

And, here, also from Nobel.org, are pictures of Dr. Roth (above) and Dr. Shapley.

 

 

2012 economics Nobel Prize winner

Posted by: adminEcon
Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
Comments (0) Add a Comment

16809_wedding rings..12.16.11_000014132683XSmall

When North Carolina’s voters rejected same sex marriage, they were not thinking economically.

Traditionally, marriage has been about specialization. With the husband in the labor force and the wife at home, their division of labor resembled a small factory. He supplied the income and she was the “domestic specialist.” As in the factory, specialization led to a more productive household.

No more.

Marriage has become a different kind of economic unit. In many households, both partners earn income and both (or none) cook. Washing machines, dishwashers and microwave ovens minimize chores. We have day care and take-out.

With the division of labor changing, so too has the institution. Previously marriage was based on shared production. Now, increasingly, marriage is all about shared consumption. Marriage has become what economists Betsey Stevenson and Justin Wolpers call “hedonic.”

As a result, the demand and supply sides of contemporary marriage markets in which people find partners reflect new values. Correspondingly, the contemporary household as a production unit increasingly is designed for companionship and “consumption complementarity.”

And this returns us to North Carolina and same sex marriage. The new economics of marriage has changed the characteristics of the people who enter marriage markets and of the households they form. Inexorably, new incentives are leading to new choices. As more households change, will politics follow?

University of Pennsylvania economists Betsey Stevenson and Justin Wolpers (who live together and have a child but are not married) explain a lot more about the new economics of marriage here and here and here. If you want to continue further, Ezra Klein’s Washington Post Wonkbook  also discusses Stevenson and Wolpers and how their view of marriage relates to the North Carolina vote.

Posted by: adminEcon
Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , ,
Comments (0) Add a Comment

The Surprising Glass Ceiling in Sweden and France

To one group of economists, oral contraception is all about human capital.

1970 appears to have been a turning point. 40 years ago, increasingly, women started entering law school, medical school and other professional programs after college. Instead of majoring in education, more women became judges, physicians, dentists, architects, veterinarians. They entered professions that required years of their time.

As a result, female human capital–a woman’s accumulation of productive knowledge–became more valuable.

Asking why, some economists are saying one reason is oral contraception. The proliferation of birth control pills among unmarried women that started during the early 1970s helped them to time marriage and children. Once women could plan child birth, they could better determine when and how to develop their professional skills-their human capital. They could enter and complete longer educational programs, decide the duration of employment, and have control over professional goals. As a result, women entering labor markets could earn more. Earning more, their value climbed in marriage markets. And, because more women were marrying later, postponing finding a spouse was a less costly decision since, as economists Goldin and Katz express it, marriage markets for older women “thickened.”

Our bottom line: A recent economic study suggests that the pill helped to narrow the gender wage gap, to “upgrade” women’s career choices and to encourage later marriages and child birth. I wonder also whether it materially contributed to U.S. economic growth (but could not find data to confirm it.) Yes, oral contraception is a major social issue but its economic significance is probably considerable.

I started researching the economic impact of oral contraception after reading NY Times financial journalist, Annie Lowrey’s economix blog. That took me to papers by Goldin and Katz from 2002 and a group from the University of Michigan. I also looked at an interesting discussion of “The Efficiency of Gender Equity.”

Posted by: adminEcon
Tags: , , , , , ,
Comments (0) Add a Comment

wedding

By Mira Korber, guest blogger.

When Bill Clinton said Hillary Rodham was “the smartest person [he] ever met in [his] lifetime,” he was definitely expressing a changing long term trend: what husbands value in their future wives.

According to the study cited in this interesting NY Times Op-Ed, now is a better time than ever for highly educated women’s marriage prospects. In 1939, “education and intelligence” were ranked 11th on a desirable traits list; by 2008, the same category had risen to fourth place.  That placed women’s smarts above a “pleasing disposition,” number five on the 2008 wish list.

Even in 1950, 33% of all women with a college degree remained unmarried as opposed to a mere 7% of non-college educated women. By 2008, the gap had vanished for degree-holding women aged 35 to 39, and only 9% of college-educated women 55 to 59 were still unmarried.

This paper, by economist Elaina Rose, discusses the economic theory of marriage, the “marriage market,” and trending changes from 1970-1990. According to the paper, marriage market “specialization” has declined as women now complete comparable or greater educational degrees with respect to men. Therefore, the female role in the labor market is on the rise. Ms. Rose also predicts that hypergamy (marrying “up”) is overall on the decline for the coming years.

And while it’s a good time for educated women to marry, more and more aren’t marrying at all.

The Economic Lesson

Every decision you make has an opportunity cost: what you sacrifice by making a choice. In other words, whenever you choose one thing, you always give something else up.  You may choose to get married; staying single is your opportunity cost. You may choose to pursue a masters’ degree; turning down that job offer straight out of college is your opportunity cost.

These sacrifices represent trade-offs. The list of desirable female traits from 1939-2008 represents changing preference of an aggregate group of men. Here you can find relevant mathematical models and equations in another Elaina Rose paper: “A Joint Model of Marriage and Partner Choice,” which discusses how people choose their “optimal” partners for life.

Posted by: adminEcon
Tags: , , , , , , ,
Comments (1) Add a Comment

16314_4.17_000002614112XSmall

A typical young Chinese woman is looking for a husband who owns a home. Probably, she will find one because China’s single child policy and tendency toward male preference have resulted in massive gender imbalance. With so many more marriageable men than women, the husband-hunting female wields a lot of power.

Telling us more about the results of a survey of 32,000 people from 2 Chinese research groups, the NY Times explained that the real estate boom in China has divided the young male population into the haves and have-nots. The majority of women surveyed would select men with “deeds.” Yes, Chinese women care about good morals and personality, but not as much as finance. As a result, 24 million men might remain unmarried during the next decade.

The Economic Lesson

Nobel prize winning economist Gary Becker tells us that marriage is about a lot more than love. Instead, we can best understand marriage by looking at utility functions and marriage markets.

People marry because they expect to, “raise their utility level above what it would be were they to remain single.” (The Essence of Becker, p. 273) Looking for their best mate, they compete in marriage markets that have demand and supply curves. To see Dr. Becker’s descriptive and quantitative explanations, you might want to look at The Essence of Becker, pp. 273-328.

What marginal utility might marriage provide to newlyweds?

Posted by: adminEcon
Tags: , , , ,
Comments (0) Add a Comment