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Tag Archives: Princeton

economic video humor

By Mira Korber, guest blogger.

The other night I went to a classical music performance and listened to a talented but rather odd cellist. He appeared to be wearing chef’s pants underneath his concert attire; I noticed white kitchen trousers billowing out underneath suit pants. I surmised he must (like hordes of other musicians) have a day job in a restaurant and night gig performing.

Adam Davidson, host of NPR’s Planet Money, explains the similar situation of people following other risky career paths.  In his NY Times article, “Why are Harvard Graduates in the Mailroom,” he shows how Hollywood artists and new college graduates often choose careers with transient, low-pay beginnings, but with the slim potential for enormous pay-off.

Asserting that Hollywood, legal, consulting, accounting, and entrepreneurial pursuits (among other fields) are such “economic lottery systems,” Davidson’s premise is that these industries are truly sink-or-swim for young starters. Compounding the issue, safe, secure “Plan B” jobs, like tax filing or work at the local hardware stores, are not as abundant as they used to be, thanks to technological advancements and inexpensive overseas alternatives.

For another perspective on the issue: this article suggests Davidson’s example of Hollywood superstars may be a bit simplified, and offers an interesting analysis of his economic-lottery theory.

To see which careers graduates from Princeton, Yale, and Harvard actually end up choosing, check out the statistics in this post. Actually, most Harvard grads go into finance rather than hitting the mailrooms.

The Economic Lesson

Joseph Schumpeter’s theory of creative destruction perfectly exemplifies where the “Plan B” (according to Davidson), jobs have gone:

“Technology and cheaper goods from overseas have replaced many of the not-especially-creative professions. A tax accountant loses clients to TurboTax; many graphic designers have been replaced by Photoshop; and the small shopkeeper by Home Depot, Walmart or Duane Reade.”

An Economic Question: How do you see creative destruction taking place in your life?

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Joining Harvard and the multitudes they hoped would follow, in 2006, Princeton eliminated its early admissions option. Now, with Harvard and the University of Virginia, Princeton has said it will return to early admissions because few followed.

The Economic Lesson

I wonder whether we can explain both decisions through game theory. First, let’s call the market structure within which Ivy League schools compete, an oligopoly. With few market participants on the supply side, a “price making” capability (admissions standards), and difficult entry and exit (colleges neither leave nor enter the Ivy League), schools typically wield considerable power.

Also, as oligopolies, they engage in game theory. Here is how it works. The two firms (or schools) know that, to some extent, they are interdependent; one school’s decisions affect the other school. Consequently, each one tries to predict what the other will do.

The result is a behavioral matrix called the prisoners’ dilemma. Imagine a square divided into quarters. For example, above the left quarter is Princeton/no early admission. Above the right quarter is Princeton/early admission. To the left of the upper quarter is Penn/no early admission. To the left of the lower quarter is Penn/early admission.

You can fill in the matrix. Where Princeton/no early admission and Penn/no early admission converge, we could say that equal numbers of students apply. However, what happens when they converge with one school not doing it and the other proceeding? What if neither proceeds?

As you can see here, the prisoners’ dilemma conveys the pros and cons of unilateral behavior and of collusion. The problem, as Princeton discovered, is that market participants cannot guarantee competitors’ behavior.

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At the University of North Carolina (UNC), the average G.P.A. was 2.49 in 1967 and 3.21 in 2008. Are we 25% smarter?

In a 2003 Washington Post article, one of the nation’s grade inflation experts, Stuart Rojstaczer, then a Duke professor, explained his grading considerations. Realizing if he gave “the C’s some students deserve, my class will suffer from declining enrollments…low enrollments are taken as a sign of poor-quality instruction. I don’t have any interest in being known as a failure.” Consequently, his grades ranged from A to B-. They reflected the trend toward everyone getting A’s “except for the occasional self-destructive student who doesn’t hand in assignments or take exams–if exams are given.”

At UNC, concern has developed about recognizing outstanding scholarship. If everyone gets an A, then who is outstanding? The UNC solution, currently being considered by a committee, is to publish additional information such as median grades in specific courses. A controversial policy at Princeton has been to limit A’s to 35% of the student population.

At certain law schools, though, the opposite is unfolding. At Loyola Law School in L.A., all averages have moved up by .333. Starting with their fall, 2008 classes, NYU implemented a new (higher) grading curve that included an A+. “We believe that the new curve will more accurately represent the achievements of our students to the outside world.”

The Economic Lesson

As economists, the price system first comes to mind. Prices are signals that convey information. If we compare grade inflation to price inflation, we can say that high grades, when given to everyone, convey increasingly less information about student achievement. When prices convey no information, as in Zimbabwe, people turn to alternative currencies.

And yet, again, as economists, if we think of incentives, a teacher does not want to be the only one giving lower grades because of diminished enrollment. A school does not want to be the only institution giving lower grades because it might harm students’ employment opportunities.

So, as was true during pre Sherman Anti-trust Act era for corporations, should schools together agree to lower grades? But then, will we see the results of corporate collusion collapsing when firms deviate from the “rules’ that cartels try to establish?

Your opinion?

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